“I have argued previously for the priority of “attentionality” over “intentionality”—attention must precede intention, and “intention” individualizes what is “joint” in attention, making it more of a declarative than an ostensive concept.”
From the Archive
“I insist, though, on making “attentionality” the prior, constitutive concept.”
“But intentionality depends upon having one’s attention drawn to the object, and having one’s attention drawn depends upon attending to another who brings the object into view and, finally, upon becoming an object of attention of others (an attention one can’t share).”
“In shared, or joint attention, is the fundamental equality-on-the-scene that constitutes the human.”
“All the resources we need for thinking about ethics lie in joint attention, in our ability to point to something, and approaching ethics in this way might enable us to create more minimal, more pared down, ethical vocabularies.”
“We can trace the emergence of intentionality from attentionality, whether by “intentionality” we mean the more philosophical notion of constituting an object or the more everyday use of the term as meaning to do something.”
“ethics involves both ostentation and conferring a completed ostentation upon others, or the conversion of attentionality into intentionality.”
Across the Corpus
How this idea is developed elsewhere in the archive, earliest to latest.
“But such chains are merely formal constructions that fail to correspond to any specific human behavior. I would stress that I do not attribute this failure to the limits of our mental capacity–limits which, incidentally, are not shared by the computers we use to help us think–but to the fact that human language as originarily constituted operates on two…”
“In other words, attention is not joint until all the participants show, through signs, that they are letting the object be so as to see what it has to show, to hear what it has to say—in which case, each participant must be inspected, so to speak, or credentialized, by having the sign they put forth validated. For one’s joining of the line of attention to…”
“The ethical stance is not so much learning the language of the other, or teaching the other one’s own language, because “language” is not a static entity that can stand still long enough for it to be the same language once it has been learned as it was when it began being taught. Rather, ethics involves learning the emergent language that arises at the…”
“The short answer here is that a shared attentional state is a necessary condition for language, and the proof is simply that language works. While each individual at the scene may differ in some ways, the originary hypothesis claims that they must understand the essential meaning of the sign in the same sense, or else the sign would not function as it did…”
“There is never what we call shared joint attention between the rivals. Of course an attempt to grasp the object will elicit a response from a hierarchical superior, but this response is to an undesirable obstacle, not to a shared desire; replacing the inferior conspecific with a scavenger of another species would not change the mental configuration. Now…”
“Considered at its most minimal, language is grounded, as Michael Tomasello along with Eric Gans has shown, in joint attention—the capacity to pay attention to the same thing at the same time, to know that we are doing it, and to know that we know (to let each other know). It should be possible, then, to analyze all human, which is to say social, phenomena,…”
“I have argued previously for the priority of “attentionality” over “intentionality”—attention must precede intention, and “intention” individualizes what is “joint” in attention, making it more of a declarative than an ostensive concept. We can trace the emergence of intentionality from attentionality, whether by “intentionality” we mean the more…”
“Eventually, I found that I had to make one exception to the exclusivity of the grammatical vocabulary, and that was the concept of the “center.” The concept of “attention” has already to be entered into grammatical discourse, because some minimal mention of the mode of being capable of using these signs is necessary even to speak of the signs, and there’s…”
“There’s a kind of spatial problem involved with speaking of the center and I think I’m ready to resolve it at this point. What I mean is that “the center” is always what draws your attention right here and now—and, even if it’s something you’re looking at by yourself, the fact that you are directing human attention towards it means that the attention is…”
“To start with, if we can fold moral reciprocity into the shared attention constitutive of the sign and scene, couldn’t we say that what is immoral and a denial of reciprocity is whatever interrupts that shared attention? There are two ways shared attention can be interrupted: first, through some kind of distraction; second, through some kind of fixation.…”