Question for neoabsolutists
Here's the way I think about it. There is always a center in any human interaction. In hierarchical social orders there is a social center and this position is always occupied by a central authority. All social activity takes place under the "sign" of the central authority, and all social actors try to make their actions conform to the terms set by the central authority--that's the only way they can make sense. There is always a difference between the social center and the central authority occupying it--the central authority is never a perfect fit. There is no guarantee that the central authority will exercise power commensurate to the size of the "circumference" of the circle he is the center of. In fact, he never really will without the governed "supplementing" his power by rising up to meet, so to speak, his commands. Rather than saying that sovereignty is indivisible, I would say there is nothing outside of the sovereign, or the central authority. If the power exercised from the center is not commensurate to the circumference, then it is not as if those on the circumference, or the margins, are authorities over themselves, or free of authorities--what it means is that they will try to make the center "work," or act as if it does work, or get mobilized by someone who promises to make it work.
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What it means to be kind, what it means to be sociopathic, etc., will depend upon existing social structures--"sociopath" is in particular a uniquely modern concept (so is "addict"). Not everything we notice about human bodies needs to have a direct correspondence to something in the power structure--how we respond to and make sense of such things always will, though. Even more fundamentally, though, we are members of a community before, and in order to see ourselves as, any of those things.
"Free will" is a very specific (Western) philosophical concept. As a concept it is a product of debates within a particular discipline and a particular social order. These debates are in turn parts of larger power structures and struggles. It has a history, in other words. That doesn't necessarily mean it has no reality: where there is is a concept imbued with power, people will live it, and make it real, for good or ill. But there are lots of other ways of speaking about how people make intelligent and responsible decisions.
Dissidents of a system of dissident *of that system*\--their actions only have meaning insofar as they align with and supported by others seeking to "supplement" the center.
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You could track the relations between brain activity and behavior, but since behaviors are different in different societies how could you actually say, in a transcultural way, "x configuration of neurons firing corresponds to y behavior," when there are societies that don't have y behavior. You could do cross-cultural studies, always from within a specific cultural space, and you could observe--very indirectly, of course--some common Medieval behavior and say "this looks like what we call sociopathy." (Of course we'd know nothing about their neurons.) We'd also then have to not that they call it something else, and may value it differently. We can keep learning more about relations, and possible relations, between biology and culture, without assuming some final, comprehensive, transhistorical mapping of one onto the other.
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I think your biological determinism is going to be very limiting. Do high T-levels make a couple of unintelligent guys more likely to duke it out over a stray insult? Maybe. Do high T-levels help to account for medieval Japanese samurai warriors spending years of training and discipline so as to engage in a highly ritualized form of battle? Maybe in a broad sense--maybe the low T Japanese became priests and the high-T became samurai, if they could. But being a samurai also involves exercising a great deal of self-restraint. Is that also a result of high-T? Is it high-T channeled in a particular way? High-T balanced by something else? Is there a qualitative distinction between different kinds or expressions of T that we haven't recognized yet? We could call the bar brawl and a samurai duel "fighting," but the people involved won't necessarily recognize the two activities as the same. How do we decide whether the differences are more important than the similarities (let alone what we count as differences and similarities)? In the end there's going to be pretty low ceiling on what you can explain by "high-T."
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I'll put it this way: there are all kinds of things outside of language, biology included, but we can only know them in language, which means through historically inherited frames.
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Also: human culture no doubt also shapes human biology even if not as if on a "blank slate."
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Yes this is all language as well--even memories are social. We haven't addressed the specific kinds of examples you give here, but I'm sure some GA-informed cognitive psychologist could. Language is always scenic, so we always have a sense or memory of the scenes on which we heard and saw things that couldn't be put into words very easily. It would actually be an interesting thing to work on--there must be a kind of scenic "aura" to words that can't be put into words and would include images and models.
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It may be that even animal visualize stuff--they say that dogs dream, right? Recalling a memory, though, or understanding a concept through visualization is only possible for someone with a "scenic imagination."
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Yes it's different--you know when it's appropriate to say or respond to "dinner is served," and not because you've been rewarded every time you say or respond to it.
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What it looks to you, with your third-order intentionality, like the cat is doing, is not necessarily what the cat is doing.
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We will have to wait for some neurologist to get interested in GA--or maybe Tomasello.