“Victimary thinking is, most fundamentally, resentment towards civilization—a resentment only possible for the civilized, or those in close proximity to them.”
From the Archive
“Resentment is the emotion (?) or attitude (?) one has towards whomever denies you your desire.”
“All resentment is directed at someone who has usurped, or prevented us from occupying, “our” center.”
“Individual resentment toward the center is the source of innovation in human affairs.”
“But victimary thinking enacts this resistance and refusal as a resentment of firstness: Nazism’s extremities are just the extension of the striving for pre-eminence among nations, among firms in the economy, among ideological and religious claims, and so on.”
“Indeed, victimary thinking is predicated upon the suspense of honor as a reciprocal principle, demanding honor for the designated victim but guilt and shame for the oppressor.”
“The victimary thinker sees all sufferers, including the environment, as our victims, and implicit in the victimary configuration is that it is within our power to rectify the situation.”
Across the Corpus
How this idea is developed elsewhere in the archive, earliest to latest.
“But then why did it become a victim, which is to say, a communal focus of resentment, in the first place? Love cannot express itself with the concreteness of resentment; but precisely for this reason, its expression is a model of the community-creating function of language. The formula “I love you” offers insights into originary language. More about this…”
“Sacrificial thinking is designed to justify the necessary evil of this discharge of resentment toward the central being that can never fully incarnate the divinity and put an end to conflict rather than merely defer it. Sacrificial thinking is a necessity of ritual society , all the more so in its often repressive hierarchical forms. But in market…”
“In her talk on “witnessing” that concluded the UCLA GA – Religion series last month, Stacey Meeker suggested an interesting paradigm. If we consider the scenic center in its capacity as the center of significance, the relation of the observing periphery to it is one of resentment . But the witness to “trauma,” one of Stacey’s two witnessing categories,…”
“Only victimary status still provides some degree of universal authority, breadth of terrain being counterbalanced by narrowness of focus. And even here, the institutionalization of the various genres of victim studies generates new sets of professional specializations–and a concomitantly less victimary orientation. There is no world without resentment. The…”
“The point of this concept was to serve as an originary model for resentment between those on the periphery: the scandal of my absolute inferiority to the center must precede that of my relative inferiority to my rival, since what I feel as “inferiority” is a relation of significance , in contrast to the pecking-order rivalries of the animal world. Yet it…”
“In a prehuman hierarchy, the participants’ hostility, which we should not yet call resentment, would be directed at those higher in the pecking order. These animal societies permit the one-on-one externalization of aggression, either in an actual fight for supremacy or in a gesture of ritualized submission. What is specific to human resentment is its…”
“If centrality—sympathy, attention (not to mention attendant material benefits)—is to be granted to certain forms of suffering, misfortune or subjection-by-others, those who actively claim it may logically “deserve” it as much as those upon whom it has been bestowed without conscious effort on their own parts, those whom we do not perceive as “playing the…”
“I take on the resentments of that power center. This reciprocal relation continues, and is continually restructured as new imperatives from the center realign its centrality and my own. New obligations emerge, to my fellow “centers,” who mediate my relationship to the power center. Insofar as the power center keeps remediating these relationships, I imagine…”
“In revolutions and among the French casseurs or our Antifa activists, this may lead to violence, but one cannot explain the victimary phenomenon merely as the discharge of aggression. Whereas in pre-modern society, resentment was considered sinful, and far more often than today both led to violence and was followed by atonement, in the modern peacetime…”
“(Has any philosophy or human science tried to get to the bottom of this line of questioning, which reduces any other line if inquiry to near irrelevance—which I say at the risk of arousing resentment, because nothing can be/seem more unfair than having one’s central concerns minimized.) When is resentment energizing and when paralyzing? Our recourse must…”