Neoabsolutism as a Contender for the Title of The Fourth Political Theory
A very good start. I haven't read this book, but from other things of Dugin I've read, he also puts enormous influence on tradition. I would almost have expected him to name "tradition" the fourth subject.
Does neoabsolutism propose a new subject, or is "political subjectivity" inextricably tied to liberalism? The point of having a subject is unite agency and process in history--the power of the individual advances, the power of the working class advances, etc. If neo-absolutism has no subject, then it would "measure" developments (and create corresponding organizations) in some other way.
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It's a subject/agent without a narrative, then. Insofar as the sovereign is sovereign, he's immobile--he's not going anywhere, he's not overcoming anything, he has no antagonist. I'm not necessarily objecting, just pointing out differences. I wonder whether the notion of "subjectivity" relies upon some narrative of liberation from subjugation. If the sovereign represents order, we'd need to posit disorder for the sovereign to do anything (the best sovereign in the best state would do almost nothing, or at least nothing particularly visible), but why concede the necessity of disorder? One could say the chain of command could always be further clarified--but not in any single, predictable way, so there's little promise of a narrative there.
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Absolutism's break with modernity might be so radical as to require a different vocabulary, one which doesn't include "subjectivity." I think that absolutism enhances civilization, so something is happening, and it is linear to some extent (we can distinguish between more and less civilized, even if there are many ways of being civilized), so there are narratives, just not of struggle, liberation and self-transcendence, ending in some apocalyptic upheaval and denouement. What really happens under absolutism, I think, is that traditions that were tacitly accepted by the sovereign come to be recognized, named and cultivated by the sovereign. Everything aims at being "titled," but there are always more things and there's no illusion that everything will be titled once and for all. The sovereign is at the center of this process, but not as subject or "protagonist," it seems to me--just like the Bible isn't really "about" God. But we might be able to see it as an open-ended asymmetrical dialogue between sovereign and subjects. The will of the sovereign is increasingly embedded in the traditions he acknowledges, while becoming more expansive and forward looking as a result. The difference with modernity, then, is that we see no end to to it, want no end to it, and don't imagine or desire that future developments would be unrecognizable to us now. Maybe the postmodern notion of little vs. grand narratives is relevant here.
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In a sense, the question you are asking is whether absolutism is utopian from the standpoint of GA. Successful absolutism would eliminate resentment as a motive force of history, but how is that possible in terms of mimetic theory and originary thinking? There is, I find, a persistent ambiguity and ambivalence in Gans's thinking about resentment: it sometimes figures as a destructive force, to be minimized (but why not, then, ultimately eliminated?); sometimes as productive of ethics, esthetics and economic development. Maybe there are different modes of resentment, or different modes of "framing" or "channeling" it. I would probably be ready to use, for absolutism, the terms Gans using for discussing the market economy: it "recycles" resentment in productive ways. All the forms of resentment--"jealousy," "envy," "ambition" and the rest--are ultimately resentment toward the center before they are directed at other individuals. It is the center that has not given us our "due." Sovereignty contains this resentment by establishing means of recognizing it where possible and defusing or suppressing it when necessary. Absolutism is crucial first of all as a statement of reality, rather than aspiration: there is a central power, originating in the Big Man. That's what I understand by "absolutist ontology." The question then is whether that central power is to be secure and coherent: can consequential and measurable decisions be seen to be issuing from it? The more coherent central power, the more resentment can be recycled productively--the market, I believe, cannot in fact do this--to the extent that "the market" even refers to something real. "Life" doesn't have to mean "tragedy" or "rises and falls"--it can mean increased discipline and increasing identification and formalization of hierarchies and differences. It can mean more effort expended usefully and beneficially and less energy wasted on stupid fighting. But there must also be an abstractness to such discussions--theorizing is at the very least simulating responses to all the questions that will come our way the more we engage with other positions.
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In a sense, the question you are asking is whether absolutism is utopian from the standpoint of GA. Successful absolutism would eliminate resentment as a motive force of history, but how is that possible in terms of mimetic theory and originary thinking? There is, I find, a persistent ambiguity and ambivalence in Gans's thinking about resentment: it sometimes figures as a destructive force, to be minimized (but why not, then, ultimately eliminated?); sometimes as productive of ethics, esthetics and economic development. Maybe there are different modes of resentment, or different modes of "framing" or "channeling" it. I would probably be ready to use, for absolutism, the terms Gans using for discussing the market economy: it "recycles" resentment in productive ways. All the forms of resentment--"jealousy," "envy," "ambition" and the rest--are ultimately resentment toward the center before they are directed at other individuals. It is the center that has not given us our "due." Sovereignty contains this resentment by establishing means of recognizing it where possible and defusing or suppressing it when necessary. Absolutism is crucial first of all as a statement of reality, rather than aspiration: there is a central power, originating in the Big Man. That's what I understand by "absolutist ontology." The question then is whether that central power is to be secure and coherent: can consequential and measurable decisions be seen to be issuing from it? The more coherent central power, the more resentment can be recycled productively--the market, I believe, cannot in fact do this--to the extent that "the market" even refers to something real. "Life" doesn't have to mean "tragedy" or "rises and falls"--it can mean increased discipline and increasing identification and formalization of hierarchies and differences. It can mean more effort expended usefully and beneficially and less energy wasted on stupid fighting. But there must also be an abstractness to such discussions--theorizing is at the very least simulating responses to all the questions that will come our way the more we engage with other positions.
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The notion of human decision has clearly been central all along--absolutism rejects the kinds of determinism and structuralism you are seeing. You are obviously seeing it, though, so I'll certainly have that in mind. Ultimately, governing is a "practice" in the sense RF is giving it in his essay on MacIntyre in the journal, so it is a question of virtue, like any other practice.
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You may know of more absolutists than I do, so I don't know what you're referring to. But, yes, I agree with your statement and my reading of the absolutist maxim "become worthy, accept power, rule" implies preparation for excellence in rule. The problem for some might be that the insistence on excellence seems to imply a judge of the sovereign (someone who could remove him for viciousness), but I think I've accounted for why that doesn't follow.
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Thanks.
That maxim comes from Moldbug, I believe, but I see it fairly regularly on NRx and related sites.
My account has been that the subjects request clear instructions from the sovereign. If there's unsecure power, that manifests itself in unclear commands. Those obligated to obey are expressing loyalty in asking that the commands be clearer; at the same time, they are providing the sovereign with feedback and, in extreme cases, implicit warnings.
I hope this dialogue will continue.
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It's all interesting, and, yes, the subject-object distinction coincides with liberalism, but ultimately it's anthropology, not philosophy that we need. We'll be coming back to this, I'm sure, probably fairly soon.