GA got beef with Computationalism?

I'm pretty sure timelyinquisitor has one of Andrew Bartlett's essays in mind--Bartlett speaks about the "computational model of mind," in part making the kind of argument you're making here--as you both seem to agree, for GA, human thinking (and feeling, knowing, etc.) can't be reduced to computation. Anyway, even if that's what not what you have in mind, it's the place to go to answer your question.

I think I also may have mentioned the "computational model of mind" in an essay, not so much to disagree with Bartlett as to suggest another away of approaching the critique. But the way you remember the argument doesn't sound familiar.

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I thought this might be what you had in mind. I had Bartlett's critique in mind here, and I essentially agree with it, but disagree with "critiquing" the "computational model of mind." I disagree not because I "believe" in the CMOM, but because I don't believe in "critique." Or, at least, I see critique (in the sense of showing that another way of thinking is "false") as very limited. The CMOM doesn't need to be seen as "accurate" to use it as a lens, or a way of noticing things that can then be articulated within a different framework. You can treat a theory as more like a camera than something that needs to be believed or rejected.