Bouvard on Absolutism and the Originary Big Man

Right, now I remember this. Aside from the obvious points that previous discussion touched on, like that McIntyre's political model is clearly only suitable for small city-states or maybe workers' councils, there's something more basic. Why, exactly, is it necessary for everyone to engage in deliberation over the common good? If everyone is engaged in practices within well ordered institutions, what calls for shared deliberation? Decisions will need to be made--to build a new bridge, or school, or reform practices of incarceration, etc. Whoever is in charge of those institutions will make the decision, and he will consult everyone who is competent in that area and, if he likes, representatives of communities to be affected. He needs filtered information, not to hear from everyone (until when? Everyone has had their say?). Insisting that deliberations be introduced into all goods is the way to introduce division into the community--factions, parties, professional deliberators. A sophisticated and disciplined people will be good at the things they need to be good at and will be ready to be consulted regarding the issues where their input can be valuable. Deliberation itself, in general, is not a good, or required for a just political order. If everyone is familiar with all their obligations, they will not insist on compulsory deliberation.

First of all, I'll note that your disagreement is mainly with this essay, which is what you have provided, for the sake of our discussion, as what I had assumed to be a reasonably reliable account of MacIntyre's political thinking--having, as I mentioned, little independent knowledge of his politics of my own. The conclusion of the essay is that for McIntyre's political vision to be rid of its limitations and contradictions, he would have to endorse a restoration of "Christendom." As far as I can tell, you agree with that.

Regarding the question of deliberation, I am responding to the constant repetition of "small scale" and "homogeneous," which must recur dozens of times through the essay. If the main point is having a shared understanding of the good to which the political community is dedicated, why is this insistence so necessary. What "homogeneity" is referred to here that goes beyond (as it must, otherwise it would be redundant) the shared conception of the good? I assume it must be deeply embedded traditions, ultimately rituals (including things like commemorations, celebrations, holidays, myths of origin, etc.), and maybe kinship. This would also explain the importance of the small scale. I also take it to mean more egalitarian than the nation state (liberal or any other kind) could possibly be. In other words, MacIntyre is avoiding the question of hierarchy, of subordination and superordination (and, therefore, force, violence, possession and property and sovereignty). The insistence on face to face deliberations is part of that avoidance. The members of small scale communities will deliberate with each other, as they're engaged in common practices regularly; those responsible for managing those communities, or the institutions within them, will deliberate with with other elites, and also with the more reliable subordinates (like a manager keeping in touch with an experienced and loyal worker, who is in turn trusted by other workers). And so on up the chain--the vast majority of workers will never have direct contact with a mid-level manager (or bishop, or dean), and none of them will ever get anywhere near an archbishop, executive or president. If you want to call this a deliberative order constituted by a shared inquiry into the good and common practices, I have no objection, but is this what you think MacIntyre has in mind or would find acceptable? Not from what I can see from this essay--it sounds to me like he means that anyone could talk to anyone else. If the authors want an excuse to engage in activism, what does MacIntyre want? I don't see how they're wrong to say that MacIntyre would have to declare for a Catholic order, and he understandably recoils from doing so. To insist on the restoration of Christendom is to lay conditions on sovereignty, which would lead us back to the right of resistance and so on. What will count and function as a homogeneous community itself depends on the sovereign--it doesn't come prior to and determine the content and limits of sovereignty.

What I think we're doing here is clarifying our thinking about absolutism; what I'm blogging about is originary thinking as absolutist thinking. I am following through on the assumption that the Big Man, whom Gans seems to relegate to the background and ultimately invisibility in order to argue that the telos of the originary event is the market order, is there as much as ever. The telos of the originary event is, then, clarifying sovereignty as central power, as the heir to the center of the originary scene.

Reciprocities make sense because of central power; traditions all require the at least tacit approval and "designation" of the sovereign--this is the sovereign's reciprocity with the community. This reciprocity grows with the sovereign's recognition of previously tacit traditions.

I don't know whether McIntyre's political thinking is incoherent--I know that was a claim Chris made. You suggest that MacIntyre has no objection to a hierarchical order, and that may be true, but nothing in the essay or in what you say about him suggests that he has much to say about that, or at least much he wants to say. On your view, his project is largely preservative, which precludes speaking about sovereignty. But that's my main concern here, so he doesn't help me that much. He certainly doesn't see sovereignty as part of thinking, as far as I can see.