A question on Generative Anthropology and individualism
There are people working within GA who are liberal individualists on precisely the grounds you give here--that individuals, not as an ontologically primary category, but as a historical development, are real. Even in that case, though, we'd have to see this form of individuality as constrained by desires, resentments and sign-systems the individual obviously didn't create and can't transform significantly. But within that context, we could of course say that individuals "make decisions," "act on their beliefs," "change their minds," etc. We'd just want to be clear about what that entails.
My own approach is to avoid arguments over whether there are "really" individuals or not. You can't speak with someone without to some extent accepting their self-descriptions--the question is, what do you do with those self-descriptions? As individuals, I would see us as something like "delegates" or "emissaries" of the center, so, in speaking about others' wishes, desires, hopes, beliefs, etc., I would always want to frame things in terms of a dependence on and seeking out "instructions" from the center. Those hopes, beliefs, etc., in some sense at least come to us--we don't create them out of nothing. Insofar as we wish to wish for the right things, and hope to hope for the right things, we are looking for guidance from the ordering agencies we participate in. And so, first of all, as "individuals," we want those ordering agencies to be in order and provide us with coherent models.
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Eric Gans is probably the best example of the kind of "liberal individualist" I refer to in the first paragraph. It might be best to browse through his Chronicles of Love & Resentment for essays that seem relevant: [http://anthropoetics.ucla.edu/category/views/](http://anthropoetics.ucla.edu/category/views/)
You might look for his discussions of market society and liberal democracy in particular. But he's got some discussions of "celebrity" that might be relevant.
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I would say ultimately they are liberal as well. Nietzsche's individual is pre-social, interacting with others externally, outside of language and tradition, even if he does so asymmetrically. I think the only way to be outside of liberalism is to acknowledge a center (or some form of the transcendent) that stands beyond and orders individuals.