>But my worry is, what is so different about the ‘originary event’? Is it not just another instantaneous origin, from which ‘animals’ become ‘men’ and all subsequent social order must follow and be legitimized from? I'm less familiar with GA than many here, but the main difference seems to be that Hobbes' originary event is entirely secular, whereas GA's originary event is sacral in nature, explaining not only the origins of society, but of language and the sacred. But I do share your worry; perhaps once I read the primary GA sources it will prove unfounded. Like Hobbes' originary scene, GA's explains these origins on the basis of utility: there is a crisis; this crisis demands a solution; the sacred emerges via the abortive ostensive gesture as that solution. Like Hobbes' social contract, the sacred follows as a consequence of utility. Utility is not grounded in, nor does it find its ultimate reference in, the sacred. As an anthropological account, GA is superior to Hobbes' in that
I suppose that once we undertake to explain the sacred, we would have to explain it in terms of utility--the survival of the community is useful. The alternative would be to define the sacred as that which lies beyond explanation. There is only a problem, I think, when one's explanation satisfies one that once we have the explanation we no longer need the sacred. The very fact that the sacred can be explained places the explanation on a higher cognitive level, with the implicit conclusion being that the sacred was just a "mystification" after all. In today's world this is the logic of least resistance. But if the sacred is identical to the significant, then any explanation is, knowingly or not, simply further inquiry into and commentary on the sacred center, and hence dependent on it. Why is there something to talk about in the first place? What is useful, then, is what preserves and protects the center--rituals are useful in that sense. (Would it be possible to discuss the best way of obeying a ritualistic command without any reference to "use," or "serving a purpose"?) But, just like the sacred makes sacrilege possible, "use" can be an instrument of sacrilege. But even sacrilege is possible because, while the sign defers appropriation, eventually the object must be appropriated. We have to eat. We can eat under the "canopy" of the sacred, in a way that commemorates our sacred sociality, or we can present our appetites as "proof" that the sacred is a sham. Whoever actually grabbed the object first on the scene must have been seen as a dangerous transgressor, but others following would have contained that transgression and redirected it to the order instituted by the sign. But this kind of "materialist" splitting off is always possible.
So the very precondition of an explanation at all is the sacred. Interesting how that turns on its head the general form of "to explain is to subvert" seen in so many hermeneutics (cf. Nietzsche, Freud, Marx, Derrida, etc.) Re: ritual, it seems to me that the reason why ritual is so abhorrent to modern sensibilities is that, at least in comparison to dogma, it is relatively interpretation-proof. There is no reason or spirit behind a ritual observance; there is only the observance. This is the basic structure of, at least, orthopraxic religions such as Confucianism and Roman state religion. Doesn't matter whether you believe in Baal, Mitra, or Dyeus, as long as you zig where you're supposed to zig, zag where you're supposed to zag, and speak the right words, many of which have lost all semantic reference anyway. This is, in a way, a circumvention of the need to explain the sacred at all, hence modernity rejects it utterly as invalid. Another circumvention might be to consider the sacr
Yes, I see GA as subverting the subversions of the "hermeneutics of suspicion."
The rituals do get interpreted, even if there is no direct "feedback" from the interpretation to the ritual itself. The interpretation of ritual is myth. Plus, the rituals are expected to have certain effects, and whether they have in fact had those effects is a matter of interpretation. A ritual is an offer to God, the gods, or an ancestor--something is expected in return. Also, rituals require certain preconditions, and someone must determine whether those conditions are met. E.g., one must sacrifice an "unblemished" calf. Well, what counts as "unblemished"?
The rituals must have been revealed to someone, in some place, at some time. That's why the community keeps performing them. We won't be able to keep language out of it--ritual is already a kind of language. Ritual is commemoration--ultimately, GA would say, of the originary event itself. Since rituals can't be reinvented once they have been allowed to lapse, the real problem now is creating constraining forms of commemoration that do the work of ritual.
Anyway, I'm glad I gave you a cud to chew on for a while.
>Since rituals can't be reinvented once they have been allowed to lapse What do you think of something like Freemasonry, that aims to do just that? FM acknowledges that the tradition has been broken and some ritual elements lost, but aims to recover it. Is this a futile exercise?
If it's really a question of reinventing them, I do think it's futile. Why be a Freemason rather than anything else? You can't get rituals from wanting to have rituals. If we're talking about a real tradition that is frayed but not utterly broken, that's different. It doesn't seem likely right now, but it's conceivable that the Catholic Church could return to pre-Vatican II ritual practice.
I suppose Freemasonry has sustained itself for awhile, but as what? Did it ever claim to be more than a cult or a club? Does it see itself as the basis for a new social order? If so, it's obviously failed.
> "reducible" is not quite right--not everything in the declarative is already contained or implicit in the imperative. That’s what was troubling me!
That's not what ice and rock was suggesting, anyway. If declaratives convey implicit imperatives that can be "extracted" and obeyed in a wide range of situations, that's already far more than any imperative can do on its own. Even more so if what is at stake is the elucidation of further ostensives. In that case, the imperative is to discover new realities to commit ourselves to--such an imperative could only be a result of declaratives. The higher form transforms the lower form, rather than being reducible to it.