You ask helpful questions as usual. >What is it that’s constructing race? You're really asking how are identities constructed, specifically group identities, but learning from the different perspectives on how individual identities are created can also be helpful. There are so many writers you can explore on the question of identity, falling into the camps of HBD, postmodernism, and post-postmodernism. It's ultimately about inheritance, the 'tyranny' of social inheritance, and the oscillating connection between agency and sociality/sacrality (distilled down to how language works—transmits and is modified), respectively. Identity will always be an interesting, complicated topic because it's a constant narrative; analyzing it is more narrative. >What is the more fundamental identity? The shortest technical answer is 'sharing an ostensive', in a given moment, which creates a layer of a shared identity in that given moment. You do enough of these and you get a sub/culture, shared l
I agree with all this, but I'm not familiar with the study you're referencing. Race realism is important in challenging "blank slate-ism" and the subsequent implication that group disparities are results of oppression. This is obviously very important, politically, today. But beyond that nothing follows from what group differences we identify and, of course,the more subtle and complex (the more historically marked) the differences across groups the less they will be traceable to specific genetic configurations. I also assume that further studies in genetics and biology more generally will lead to all kinds of discoveries we can't anticipate, and that will probably upend some assumptions made by everyone. We can't wait for such results in making moral, ethical and political decisions.
Couldn't that lead to some other problems though? Would massacring people who resent authority then be moral in GA? Or would the argument go that this action would increase resentment in the other people who saw it taking place, thereby increasing total resentment? And if so, wouldn't that imply that people are placing a moral value on not massacring people which is contained outside of the center?
We'd have to frame better questions. (The best way to frame moral questions is itself a moral question.)The word "massacre" already implies a critical moral judgment. Hitler and Stalin wouldn't have used the word to describe what they did--they were "exterminating vermin" or fighting "the enemies of the people." Should vermin be exterminated and enemies of the people fought?If you put it that way, who could say no? What are you, pro-vermin? The question is, within what kind of moral order do we arrive at such framings, and what kind of order would provide other framings?
No one could deny that a state or central authority will have to use force on occasion, or at least must be prepared to--the questions would be, when, against whom, what kind of force, how much, for what purposes, etc. And we can't answer such questions in general.
It seems to me that this is close to meaning acts which make it easier for people to successfully coexist in the society without conflict, right? As opposed to anti-social acts which are harmful to the viability of that society. But given that most 'anti-social' actors aren't genuine psychopaths, just people who have an ideal which differs from the existing order, don't we have a problem there? Why is the existing social structure inherently more moral than the goal which they are endeavoring to bring into being by being temporarily anti-social? If those people believe themselves to be right and that their idea would make a better society, are they not moral in trying to replace our current structure with theirs? Even if that disrupts cohesion in the short term?
The question is not directly to me, but I would say that trying to change the existing order based on an "idea" external to that order (or, more likely, an idea one claims the order is "really" based on) is indeed immoral because whoever does so arrogates to himself the right to establish an *imperium in imperio*, the "true" authority which supersedes the merely actual authority, and hence introduces (or exacerbates) division into the center. Yours is the liberal argument, which leads directly to elections, rights, division/balance of powers, etc. We all have our "idea," and who is to say which of us, or which combination of us, might be right against all the others? Liberalism institutes resentment towards the center--therein lies its immorality. What is moral is obeying the imperatives issued from the center, and trying to make them more consistent and therefore the center more coherent when necessary.
Fair enough. But aren’t you sortof conflating what is socially possible and what is moral? Sure, Stalin and Lenin made killing the kulaks socially possible and framed it as a moral act, like many other tyrants, but does GA stop there and conclude that it was indeed a moral thing to do? I would argue that Stalin was an opportunistic con who usurped power and wronged people, ruling awfully. Imo people who resisted dekulakization were the moral ones, even if they ultimately failed. Why should I at all times deify the center even when it’s a P.O.S. center, is the core of the argument I’ve been making. I understand the counter that without victory and continued existence, how much morality can there really be? But these are Nietzschean, fascist, and ultimately Roman arguments—GA has not acknowledged these as influences to my knowledge.
The point is not that what these rulers did is moral--the point is that the immorality of what they did needs to be located further "upstream," in the way they have conceptualized the taking and use of power in the first place. The basis for exercising power has to be the fundamental anthropological necessity of a center. If you rule on the basis of "nature," whether it's nature located in class, race, or natural rights, you introduce perpetual struggles over the center. These perpetual struggles over the center account for the pathologies we see in pretty much all modern government, but most obviously in the 20th century "totalitarian" ones. That is what corrodes the central authority, and within such a form of rule the subject is confronted with many contradictory imperatives. The moral way to respond is act, and enable others to act, to the extent possible, in accord with the most consistent "chain" of imperatives possible. In the worst cases, like the 1930s USSR, that might not mean much more than sustaining any trust-based relationships possible--just trying to act and speak more or less the same way over a period of weeks was a challenge.
> the will of 90+% of the population What Adam is going to do is inquire further what center is really at the heart of this 'will of the people'. >Why should I call such states legitimate and take it upon myself to support them in ‘governing better’, when I am a resourceful person and could have some resistance to offer? We technically are not telling you to not resist in some ways. And for that matter, Adam is always advocating a _mutual_ transfiguration between the Middle and the High, not simple obeyance like what I've termed a 'desacralized power theorist', people who mistake moral governance with the material motions of ruling. It's not easy to preordain tactics so far in advance, but we can lay out a strategy we would like the Middle to work within, and that's to work with the force of your moral imperatives in actual operation, rather than a reification, which if you do will make you lose to the even more reified ideologies, like the thin kind of universal humanism that glo
I'll just add that the purpose of having a moral theory is not to label this or that person moral or immoral but to have a "vocabulary" with which to discuss the moral implications of one or another course of action. Person or group A might be using his/its power to mistreat person of group B and, of course, we can't be surprised if B notices this (leaving aside the question of what counts as "mistreatment"--I'll just stipulate that some things can be)--but no obvious and unequivocal course of action follows from this recognition. That's exactly where moral thinking comes into play: how to recognize these resentments, while still deferring them in the sense of not having your actions be determined by them. Even if you're oppressed, there's no reason to assume that acting as "forcefully" as you can against your oppressor all have the results you want. This is not just a strategic question, either--how you participate in the transition from one center to another will determine the quality of the new center. Ultimately, the strategic questions (how to win) are themselves moral questions--how to be the kind of "winners" that will build a sustainable and good order. The more you are able to move from singling out immediate enemies to acting within a new order, the more moral and more intelligent your actions will be.
Thanks for the reply. I don’t fully understand what it means to rule only in accordance with the need to have a center. Isn’t the question of ‘which center’ always going to bring ideology back into it, no matter how pragmatic you try to remain? Sorry if this is a thick-headed question.
It's not just that there has to be a center but that there always is one--we don't go to a supermarket, to the shelve marked "Centers," and choose the one we like. Ideologies are just the way people justify their attempts to control the center--they always identify some way of fighting other groups trying to control the center from the outside, so as to guarantee permanent control. Such permanent control is impossible, because the victory of one ideology excludes other and incites them to sharpen their own weapons. If you have an ideology, you want the government to do x, y and z. That also means you want the government to have the power to do x, y and z unhindered. But if the government has the power to do x, y and z unhindered, it will also have the power not to do these things, or other things you (and others) want it to do. Realizing this is the beginning of political wisdom. The thing to want from the government is that it governs, clearly--that we know who is in charge, who is second in command, third, fourth and so on--and where we are in that order. This means we want it to be free of the Xs, Ys and Zs of all the different interest groups, i.e., all the ideologies. If you ask, what is such a government actually doing--what does it consider "good"?; the answer is, whatever follows from its origins, that is, from the event that enabled its establishment in the first place. Because such a government can only be established by providing a means for all the conflicting groups to defer their resentments towards the others, which means to defer their resentments toward the center for "privileging" the other groups over one's own. This would require both exemplary leadership and exemplary "followership," because on both sides there would have to be the acknowledgement that there is no path from the intensification of resentments to their "satisfaction."
The only way to keep resentments within limits is to keep power and responsibility aligned. If someone has a job to do (responsibility) he needs to have the power to do it; if someone has power, he needs to have corresponding responsibilities. Ensuring this is the case is the main responsibility of the central authority. There will always be power differentials, but they don't always generate the same level of resentment. The resentment comes when we are obliged to do what we are not given the means to do, or when power is used irresponsibly. That's what it means t be "screwed over," and it's possible to develop shared criteria for determining when it has actually happened and how it should be remedied.
The shared criteria are narrowly focused. I don't mean everyone in a social order has to agree on, e.g., how a law should be enacted. If we're able to continue our conversation here, it's because we have shared criteria regarding what counts as a "response," as an answer to a question, etc., Any functioning workplace or institution has similar shared criteria--the less functional, the less is shared.
Of course, people want power, and existing institutions often thwart honest efforts at productive work. Every social order limits the desire for power one way or another--it's just a question of how best to do so. And dysfunctional institutions is the reason we're developing these diagnoses in the first place. If everyone used their transparently delegated power responsibly, politics would essentially disappear as a topic of discussion and we'd be talking about other things.
In the case of a conversation, the question is not whether we agree, but whether we are still having a conversation. As long as we are still having a conversation, resentments regarding what has been said by either party can be addressed within the conversation. It's the same thing with uses of power and institutional relations. The question is, are we still working within the same project, for the same purposes? (Of course, there is some elasticity to the notion of "same" here.) If we're still working together, the answer is yes; if the subordinate can ask the superior to clarify a command or to help settle a dispute with another subordinate, the answer is even more clearly yes. This means resentments can be addressed within the system, even if there's not universal agreement on every single thing. The question is whether people feel they have recourse, and I am assuming that they are more likely to feel this if they actually do have recourse--and even more likely if frivolous objections are rejected. Now, you can say, what will count as "recourse," as "frivolous," etc., but unless you want to say it is always equally impossible to arrive at any shared use and meaning of these terms, you have to acknowledge things can be arranged so as to increase the shared understanding of them.