Why is the sovereign not the subject? Semi-unrelated: You wrote about Achilles as a metaphor for bottom-up Value versus top-down Security and the fundamental problem for the sovereign in balancing these considerations. Is this correct? If so, do you disagree that Mises's Economic Calculation argument can be considered as a formalization of the Value-side of the argument? The idea is that there is "bottom-up" or "ascendent" value that arises somewhat externally from the sovereign's clarified hierarchy. Although the market is sustained by the sovereign, the consequences are not fully predictable, the rules are enforced, but the results are not guaranteed. The rules are made, the refs enforce the rules, but which team wins the sovereign does not directly determine nor does he know. And if he does determine it, then the game is meaningless and the teams don't even try. Value can be utilized by the sovereign, but it is *not* value that is created by the sovereign directly. The market's res
I don't think we can see the sovereign as the subject because there is no constitutive (reciprocally defining) antagonist--the bourgeoisie has the state, king, aristocracy and/or superstitions (or whatever), the proletariat has the capitalists, feminists the patriarchy, anti-colonialism imperialism, etc. The subject defines itself through this struggle, and that's what makes "history." The only equivalent for the sovereign would be something like "disorder" or "division," but that would grant the necessity of such antagonists, and of defining sovereignty in that relation, which we wouldn't want to do if we contend that sovereignty can be made secure.'
I'll think about the other issue and get back to you.
Why is the sovereign not the subject? Semi-unrelated: You wrote about Achilles as a metaphor for bottom-up Value versus top-down Security and the fundamental problem for the sovereign in balancing these considerations. Is this correct? If so, do you disagree that Mises's Economic Calculation argument can be considered as a formalization of the Value-side of the argument? The idea is that there is "bottom-up" or "ascendent" value that arises somewhat externally from the sovereign's clarified hierarchy. Although the market is sustained by the sovereign, the consequences are not fully predictable, the rules are enforced, but the results are not guaranteed. The rules are made, the refs enforce the rules, but which team wins the sovereign does not directly determine nor does he know. And if he does determine it, then the game is meaningless and the teams don't even try. Value can be utilized by the sovereign, but it is *not* value that is created by the sovereign directly. The market's res
You are right about the problem I am trying to solve there. This is obviously something we'll be discussing quite a bit--the entire discipline of economics needs to be revised, but that obviously can't be done arbitrarily. My preliminary thinking is that we should think about value as value for the sovereign, just like Achilles's prowess ultimately finds its value in service to Agamemnon's enterprise. Achilles, of course, can withhold his services (as he in fact does), or offer them to another sovereign--but they have to be of value to some sovereign. The same is true in less obvious ways of all forms of work. The sovereign, then, is responsible for establishing institutional forms in which limited competition with a determinate goal is embedded. This would probably prioritize the military and harness production for those ends. And then, yes, there would be rules, a more or less fair playing field, and all the rest.
Well, starting with the previous reddit discussion on the question of subjectivity, you suggest that the modern subject is inherently resentful inasmuch as he's tied to a narrative of "liberation" with an apocalyptic vision. So, if absolutism is a break with that, with narratives no longer centred on the resentful subject, the question arises how does resentment, which is inevitable in some form I think you would admit (though you come close to denying it when you read Gans' understanding of resentment as "ambivalent" and ask, why, if we can talk of minimizing resentment we can't talk of eliminating it) get contained by absolutism within the disciplines and hierrchies in some way that does not put into question the larger social order. And you go on to say that you are willing to adapt Gans' notion of the market recycling resentment to the conceptualization of absolutism. The more the sovereign is secure, the more productively he can recycle resentments. Then in the blog post I se
I see. Thanks. Yes, you have a point. I may simply be channeling Gans's ambivalence. He speaks both of "reducing" and "recycling" resentment--my observation that if resentment can be reduced it can be eliminated, since what would elimination be other than continual reduction until there's nothing left? derives from my questioning of that concept in particular. I've more or less accepted the notion of "recycling," even if I rarely use it myself. I usually speak either in terms of "framing" and "donating" resentments--"framing" is not too different from "recycling," but "donating" is something different, and so maybe it's better to stick with that. The center then converts the resentment to discipline, which I suppose is a kind of "recycling" but more loosely so insofar as here the recycled material becomes something qualitatively different--recycled glass is still glass. Perhaps in this way I can resolve my own ambivalence toward resentment, which I inherit from Gans but which has persisted for me in somewhat different forms. Rather than struggling to distinguish productive from destructive forms of resentment, I can just just distinguish resentment from discipline. Well, we'll see how that works.
If both Girard and Gans are right, resentment is rooted in the paradox of the sacred and we will never resolve our ambivalence towards it. It will remain a component of discipline, but, yes, i don't see why you can't distinguish active resentment from disciplined resentment.
Well, even in that case there'd be no point to speaking of "reducing" or "recycling" resentment, both of which assume that it's some kind of "excess" that needs to be "discharged" (another terms Gans uses). Unless there's a "normal" level of resentment and the problem is with "excessive" resentment--but the whole problem here lies in thinking about in quantitative terms, as if it can be measured--that is what needs to be rejected, one way or another. Once we're clear about this the rest may be semantics.
Well i like the idea of making a donation without measuring how much i'm giving! Still, i fear there will always be more, to give. Do you think there's something to the (Buddhist?) idea of transcending resentment if we give up our desires and reach "enlightenment"?
Yes, but I don't think it's exclusive to Buddhism. I think this is central to Jewish and Christian monotheisms--since God has given you everything, you are obliged to give all of yourself to God. This is how we transcend the gift economy and the imperative order (a god you can issue imperatives to is a god you cut deals with--the imperative you issue is that he uphold his end of the bargain because you followed his imperative. That's what I AM THAT I AM transcends).